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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
During the Vietnam War, communist forces were able to operate in both the 
conventional and guerrilla spheres.  That is to say, the communist military forces were 
able to conduct force-on-force operations as well as use classic insurgent tactics against 
US and Allied military forces.  These conventional and guerrilla operations could be 
simultaneous, independent, or supportive of each other. Operating in between the 
conventional and guerrilla realm was a separate force that acted as both a conventional 
and guerrilla force.  This force was as well trained, well equipped, and highly motivated.  
Most personal memoirs and histories of the Vietnam War mention this force, often 
referred to as the “dreaded” Sapper, but little is known or understood today about the 
Sapper.   
The US military historically has had few opportunities to deal with actual enemy 
special operations forces during combat operations.  Enemy special operations or special 
operations forces often have been cited as a clear danger to US military operations, but 
rarely has their successes been discussed.  This threat was especially true when talking of 
the Soviet Union and North Korea.  However, according to US military history and 
doctrine, the US has not had to face enemy special operations on a large scale since the 
end of World War II.  Unfortunately, this statement ignores the US military experience in 
Vietnam.  Vietnam should have been a great example of how the enemy could conduct 
special operations and what the effects on the battlefield could be.  Regrettably, 
American pride has ignored this fact.  It seems very ironic that the most well know 
communist special operation against the US forces, the attack on the American embassy 
during the Tet Offensive of 1968, has been nearly ignored for what it was.             
Much has been written about Tet and the attack on the US embassy in Saigon in 
1968, but not about the communist forces that were directly involved in the attack on the 
embassy.  Although the attacking force has been called everything from terrorists to 
commandos, exactly who these forces were and why they attacked the embassy are 
questions that seem to have never been addressed.  The initial research for this thesis 
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indicated that the attackers were members of the C-10 Sapper Battalion.  In turn, the 
initial definition of a sapper dealt with combat engineers.  Yet it did not make sense that a 
combat engineer would be involved in an attack such as that on the US embassy, and the 
information on hand did not give a satisfactory answer about who this force was.  After 
more research, though, a pattern developed regarding the war in Vietnam.  The 
communists had certain specialized forces that carried out unique missions.  These 
missions were similar to US Special Forces direct action missions. 
Further research has enabled the author to categorize these specialized 
Vietnamese forces into three sub-categories.  The first would be the Special Action 
Group / Urban Sapper.  The second sub-category would be the Field Sapper, and the final 
sub-category would be the Water Sapper.  Each of these elements had a very specific 
mission that required more training than the ordinary communist soldier received.  Not 
only did their mission require more training, but their mission was also very specialized 
and incorporated unique elements not associated with ordinary communist military 
forces.  Because these Vietnamese forces did not meet the standard US definition of 
special forces, they tended to be overlooked or ignored.  Unfortunately by this standard 
definition, only a few nations’ special forces would be worthy of serious study.  
However, this would be a mistake to assume that because a special operations unit does 
not meet our expectations it is of little consequence or threat.  
 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
With the current fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, there has been a significant 
review of insurgent warfare methods and the counter-insurgency (COIN) principles 
needed to defeat the insurgents.  The US military has a long and checkered history with 
COIN.  In some instances, the US was able to defeat the insurgent force and prevail, but 
at other times the insurgent forces were able to overcome the strength of the US military 
and inflict defeat through the use of protracted war.   
One aspect of insurgent warfare that has received little or no methodical analysis 
by the US military has been the use of special operations by insurgent forces.  These 
operations are seen by the insurgents as a force-multiplier to overcome their numerical 
inferiority.  Small numbers of insurgents are able to inflict great damage to a numerically 
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superior enemy through well planned and executed special operations.  In many cases, 
the use of special operations has gone un-acknowledged by the US military.  This 
analysis will show that insurgent use of Special Operations in Vietnam had a significant 
effect upon the battlefield, both in the tactical and strategic realm.   
 
C. SCOPE 
The timeframe covered by this research paper will be between 1963 and 1975.  
This timeframe allows analysis during the American “advisory” period, the American 
War, and the final phase when South Vietnam fought alone.  Combat actions that will be 
analyzed include attacks labeled as “terrorist” attacks, attacks on naval shipping, attacks 
on military base camps, actions during the Tet Offensive, as well as numerous other 
military operations.  This paper will explore the training requirements of the sapper force 
and how they changed during the course of the war.  The period from 1946 to 1962 will 
not be investigated as the availability of sources on the subject is extremely limited.  That 
is not to say, however, that Sappers did not exist during the French War in Indochina. 
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The analysis of Vietnamese Communist special operations forces will rely mainly 
upon translated captured enemy documents, prisoner of war interrogations, defector 
reports, and contemporary intelligence reports.  The first two chapters will discuss the 
significance, organization, and strategic context of the sappers.  Chapters III  through V 
will break down the sappers into their core mission areas and procedures.  These core 
areas will include topics ranging from attacks upon command posts and supply dumps to 
terrorism and assassinations.  The advantages and disadvantages that each type of sapper 
force had will also be discussed.  The final chapter concludes with an overall analysis of 
the success of the Sapper force and the lessons from Vietnam that can be applied to the 
conflicts today and those in the future. 
 
E. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS  
There are a number of important assumptions made regarding the source material 
for this paper.  Because the research sources relied upon consist primarily of translated 
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captured documents, prisoner-of-war interrogation reports, defector reports, and 
intelligence analysis reports, an authorial assumption has been made that the documents 
captured and translated were not forged and that the translators were accurate.  Another 
assumption is that the prisoners-of-war and defectors were mostly truthful and not 
attempting to placate or mislead their captors.  The author acknowledges that while this 
source material is not 100% accurate, it is, nonetheless, as accurate as can be expected, 
given that the war has been over for 30 years. 
A few limitations exist concerning this analysis.  Though they are primary source, 
there is a heavy reliance on captured documents as well as interrogation and intelligence 
reports.  The information that is missing is documentation from sources in the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).  Unfortunately, the DRV is still a closed 
society and gaining access to military reports and analysis on Sapper operations is 
impossible at this time.  Another limitation is that there has been no scholarly 
investigation into Sapper operations during the Vietnam War. 
 
F. PRINCIPLES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
The difference between a conventional operation and a special operation can be 
very vague.  Both operations seek to destroy an enemy element in further support of some 
military or political goal.  The two operations are conducted by trained personnel using 
equipment designed for a particular purpose.  The forces carrying out each operation are 
composed of a unit or units that meet specific criteria to conclude the operation 
successfully.  The differences between conventional and special operations are small but 
extremely important. 
What differentiates a special operation from conventional operations are the size 
of the units involved, the depth of training, and the emphasis on specific tactics.  Special 
operations are carried out by units made up of small numbers of operators as opposed to 
conventional operations where the maneuver unit typically is a battalion or larger.  
Although the forces involved in both types of operations are well trained, the forces 
conducting special operations train to a much higher standard with greater proficiency in 
individual skills.  Special operations require greater emphasis on the following principles: 
simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose (McRaven, p. 11).  These 
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principles are the building blocks from which special operations tactics are derived.  
Another factor that distinguishes special operations from conventional operations is the 
amount of extreme risk involved.  Combat always involves risk, but a special operation 
includes much greater risk because it normally occurs behind enemy lines by small units 
that rely on their tactics to achieve superiority at a given point in time over a numerically 
superior force. 
 
G. DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS 
Sapper (Western)- 1: a military engineer who lays or detects and disarms mines 
2: a military engineer who does sapping (digging trenches or undermining fortifications) 
(WordReference.com). 
Sapper (Vietnam)- As used by the Vietnamese retains the combat engineer 
connotation; however, the sapper mission encompasses those tasks normally assigned to 
units of the commando-raider-ranger type.  The sapper unit ceases to be a combat support 
element but is in fact a combat arm (Impact of the Sapper on the Vietnam War. p. 3). 
Biet Dong – Term used in South Vietnam by communist forces referring to 
commando. 
Bo Doi Dac Cong – Term used in North Vietnam referring to special forces or 
sapper. 
Combat Engineer - Combat engineering, Mobility/Counter-
Mobility/Survivability (M/CM/S), is focused on the support of combined arms maneuver. 
Combat engineering enhances operational movement, maneuver, and force protection by 
facilitating M/CM/S operations (FM 3-34 p. 1-16).  
Engineer - General engineering encompasses the construction and repair of Lines 
of Communications, main supply routes (MSRs), airfields, utility systems, and logistic 
facilities to support joint and Army military operations. It may be performed in direct 
support (DS) of combat operations such as battle damage repair (BDR) (FM 3-34 p. 1-
20). 
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PAVN – People’s Army of Vietnam.  Also known as the North Vietnamese Army 
(NVA) or the Vietnamese People’s Army (VPA).  These were the communist military 
forces that originated from North Vietnam.  
PLAF – People’s Liberation Armed Forces.  Also known as the Viet Cong (VC), 
a contraction for “Vietnamese Communist”.  The military wing of the National 
Liberation Front.  These were the communist military forces that originated in South 
Vietnam. 
ARVN – Army of Vietnam.  South Vietnamese military forces allied with the US. 
COSVN – Central Office of South Vietnam.  The Communist headquarters 
composed of the People’s Revolutionary Government and the People’s Liberation Armed 
Forces.  COSVN operated in Cambodia during the war. 
Special Operation – Operation conducted by forces specially trained, equipped, 
and supported forces for a specific target whose destruction, elimination, or in the case of 
hostages, the rescue of, is a political or military imperative (McRaven, p. 3). 
Special Operations - Defined as operations conducted by specially trained, 
equipped and organized Department of Defense forces against strategic or tactical targets 
in pursuit of national military, political, economic or psychological objectives. These 
operations may be conducted during periods of peace or hostilities. They may support 
conventional operations, or they may be undertaken independently when the use of 
conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible. (United States Army Special 
Operations Command Web Page). 
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II. ORGANIZATION AND STRATEGY 
Sapper Branch requirements according to Chairman Ho: 
Adoption of sapper tactics must be flexible. 
Acquaintance must be made with combat techniques. 
Morale must be stable. 
Discipline must be strict. 
Determination to win and destroy the enemy must be strong. 
Be loyal to the party and the people. 
Accomplish all missions and overcome any difficulties. 
 
(Felix, Report on an Oct 69 Sapper Conference held by Headquarters, SVNLA, p. 44)  
 
A. ORIGINATION 
For the European and American military expert, the term Sapper has been used in 
connotation with a military engineer that specializes in building fortifications or working 
with mines and explosives. The term sapper can be traced back to France in the 1500’s 
and to America during the Revolutionary War period (Sapper Leader Course, 2004).  
Sapper originated from the word sap, meaning “to dig trenches.”  Sappers were essential 
to siege warfare up to the First World War, and then they were vital for construction and 
repair of trenches during the Great War.  The US military did not normally use the term 
sapper except for the Combat Engineer school course that prepares US Army soldiers in 
combat engineer and infantry skills and tactics.  The term sapper is still used in many 
European militaries to categorize what the US calls Combat Engineers.  
For the Vietnamese, the sapper was involved in warfare continuously since the 
beginning of the militant Vietnamese independence movement during the mid-1940’s.  
The Viet Minh, precursor to the PAVN, used sappers against the French during the First 
Indochina War. In his book about Dien Bien Phu, Martin Windrow (2004) discussed Viet 
Minh commandos attacking several French airfields (p. 297). Many authors and military 
analysts during the Second Indochina War referred to sappers as commandos, raiders, and 
ranger like forces.  The Viet Minh commando operations as described by Windrow 
during the First Indochina War were very similar to airfield attacks by PLAF and PAVN 
sappers that were prevalent during the Second Indochina War. The Viet Minh 
commandos of 1954 began the sapper tradition that reached its pinnacle during the 
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Second Indochina War.  The eminent American Vietnam war historian Douglas Pike 
traced the history of sappers during the Vietnam War to the Sapper Combat Arm of the 
1950’s (Pike, 1986, p. 108). The earliest mention in print of the origination of 
Vietnamese sappers was by Archimedes Patti in an interview with Sedgwick Tourison.  
In the interview, Patti, a former Office of Strategic Services (OSS) officer, states that he 
helped train Giap’s Viet Minh Propaganda Teams in assassination techniques and that 
these teams were the forerunner of the sapper force (Tourison, 1995, pp. 2, 341).  If Patti 
is correct, then the PAVN/PLAF sapper force that the US faced during the war was the 
invention of the US government under the auspices of the OSS. 
The development of the sapper force in South Vietnam began soon after 
implementation of the 1954 Geneva Agreement that eventually split the nation into North 
and South Vietnam.  This development began with former Viet Minh fighters who stayed 
in South Vietnam, as well as by PAVN Sappers that moved into South Vietnam during 
the late 1950’s (National Liberation Front Military Operations. 1966, p. 3).  Through 
captured documents and prisoner debriefs, it becomes apparent that the various sapper 
operations in South Vietnam began early on in the conflict.  The operations and forces 
began small, but as the war progressed, the size and scope of both grew into sophisticated 
operations and large organizations. 
 
B. COMMAND ORGANIZATION 
The enemy that the US engaged during the Vietnam War was very different than 
any previous opponent.  Unlike the German or Japanese military during Second World 
War, or the Chinese in Korea, the enemy in Vietnam was composed of two separate 
armies with the same overall goal but with very different organizations, strengths and 
weaknesses.  The adversary in Vietnam was comprised of regular units (PAVN) as well 
as guerrilla units (PLAF).  Found within the guerrilla forces were fulltime units (Main 
Force), regional units, and local units (part-time) that fought against the US.   
Before discussing the command and control of sappers within the PLAF and 
PAVN, the relationship between the two organizations must be clarified.  During the 
American Advisory period, 1960 to 1964, the PLAF was the main organization in 
conflict with the Government of South Vietnam.  At that time, the PLAF received 
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significant military aid and advice from North Vietnam.  Once the US committed combat 
forces into South Vietnam in 1965, the relationship between the PLAF and PAVN 
changed.  Military command and control of communist forces in South Vietnam still fell 
under COSVN, but the military leadership within COSVN became increasingly North 
Vietnamese.  From 1965 to 1968, PAVN forces operated in the Central Highlands and 
northern South Vietnam, while the PLAF operated along the coastline south of Da Nang 
to the interior of southern South Vietnam into the Mekong Delta.  After significant losses 
due to the Tet Offensive in 1968, the PLAF became completely subordinate to the North 
Vietnamese even though COSVN still existed.  From 1968 to the fall of Saigon in 1975, 
the war in South Vietnam was directed by the PAVN High Command in Hanoi using the 
COSVN as a liaison with PLAF military units. 
The PLAF was the military wing of the National Liberation Front that 
administratively fell underneath the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN).  The 
COSVN was the bureaucratic headquarters that controlled communist military forces, the 
PLAF, in South Vietnam.  Appendix A shows the geographic divisions of COSVN found 
in South Vietnam.  COSVN was made up of Special Regions (SR), Military Regions 
(MR), Special Zones, and the B-3 Front.  Each of the regions, and special zones reported 
directly to COSVN.   
COSVN contained the communist headquarters for the military command and 
civilian government.  The military headquarters was composed of a number of 
departments or staff offices along with combat and support units.  The sapper chain-of-
command began at the military staff department.  Within the military staff department, 
the Sapper Command or Sapper Office was the focal point for all sapper related issues 
with COSVN.  From the Sapper Office at COSVN, the next command level down was 
the corresponding Sapper Office at the Military or Special Region Headquarters. 
The military staff at each Military and Special Region Headquarters was 
responsible for all operations within that region. Within the military staff office, the 
Sapper Office/Command was responsible for the training, organizing, equipping, and 
planning for the PLAF Sapper force.  These forces included Field Sappers, Urban 
Sappers, and Naval Sappers.  As the war progressed and North Vietnam took more 
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responsibility for all aspects of operations within COSVN, the 429th Sapper Group was 
sent into Cambodia sometime in 1968 to assume responsibilities for PLAF Sappers.  The 
429th replaced the Sapper Office/Command within COSVN and now reported directly to 
the Sapper High Command in the PAVN High Command.  As the diagram below 
illustrates, the 429th was a highly organized unit that had all the necessary functions to 
operate.  The Sapper Office at each Military or Special Region within South Vietnam 
became subordinate to the 429th Sapper Group. 
 
Figure 1.   Organizational Chart of the 429th Sapper Group (From: Westphal, 1971, p. 
11) 
 
The PAVN command structure during the war was very similar to the 
organization of COSVN. At the top of the organization was the PAVN High Command 
that controlled the combat, support, and administrative within PAVN.  Early in the war, 
PAVN Sappers were controlled from the Military General Staff Office just as PLAF 
Sappers were controlled by the Sapper Office/Command in COSVN.  However, the 
PAVN command organization changed sometime in May of 1967 with the creation of the 
Sapper Headquarters or Sapper High Command (The Impact of the Sapper on the 
Vietnam War, 1969, p. 9).  This command change increased the status of PAVN Sappers 
to the same level as their Air Defense, Armor, and Artillery Commands.  The increase in 
status meant more emphasis on Sapper techniques, better equipment, and gave the 
11 
sappers a greater voice in their own use.  The Sapper Headquarters controlled PAVN and 
PLAF Sappers for the duration of the war.  After the war ended the Sapper Headquarters 
eventually became the PAVN Special Operations Force (Bo Tu Lenh Dac Cong) (Pike, 
1986, p. 107).   
 
C.    STRATEGY 
Sapper fighting is a living symbol of our national character and soul, our 
indomitable fighting will, our creative energies.  Sapper fighting is the 
essence of Vietnam.  
Senior Col. Bach Ngoc Lien, from “The Few to Fight the Many” in Nhan Dan, December 
19, 1979 (Pike, 1986, p. 121)  
 
The idea of sapper fighting, a small and well trained force attacking a large force 
at a weak point, is not a new strategy or tactic in warfare.  The premise behind sapper 
fighting for the Vietnamese is the concept of economy of force.  This was simply to 
enable the few to fight the many, the weak to fight the strong.  Economy of force was an 
essential element of guerrilla warfare in Vietnam and anywhere else that guerrillas 
mounted a campaign against a government.  Although both share many similarities, 
sapper fighting and guerrilla warfare are not the same. 
Some might consider sapper fighting as a tactic or element of guerrilla warfare.  
Early on during the Vietnam War this statement might have been true regarding sapper 
fighting.  As PAVN officers took more control of the fighting in South Vietnam, the 
reasoning behind the use of sappers changed.  This change was an economy of force with 
a twist.  In guerrilla warfare, economy of force calls for a small guerrilla unit to attack 
and destroy an isolated and small government force.  The more government units 
destroyed means the stronger and larger the guerrilla could become over time.  For the 
sapper, however, economy of force carried a different meaning.  This was the ability of a 
small and well trained force to attack a numerically superior force from within the 
enemies’ interior lines.  PAVN General Dung Van Tien called this type of fighting the 
“blooming lotus” tactic (Turley, 1986, p. 178).  The “blooming lotus” was the ability of 
sapper units to penetrate either a city or a command post and attack outwards while a 
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III. FIELD SAPPER 
A.    MISSION 
The Sapper or Field Sapper existed in both the PLAF and PAVN.  Both 
organizations became more reliant upon Sappers as the war progressed because of 
previous successful sapper attacks.  The mission of the Field Sapper was twofold.  
Primarily, the Field Sapper had the mission to clandestinely infiltrate ARVN/US 
positions for the purpose of eliminating specific targets such as command posts, 
ammunition dumps, airfields, and etc.  The secondary mission of the Field Sapper was 
the training of sapper techniques to non-sapper forces.  This included training 
conventional infantry in the art of perimeter penetration and shock attack.  PAVN Field 
Sappers also established schools to train PLAF Sappers and other PAVN Sappers in 
Cambodia and communist-held areas of South Vietnam  According to Douglas Pike 
(1986) in his book, People’s Army of Vietnam, PAVN Sapper units were some of the first 




Field Sapper units were the model of organization for all PAVN and PLAF sapper 
units.  Field Sapper units formed the building block that Naval and Urban Sapper units 
used to organize their hierarchy and combat power, as well as to initiate the pattern for 
part-time local force guerrilla sapper forces.  The PLAF structured independent sapper 
units starting at the squad level, normally part-time units, all the way up to battalion 
strength while PAVN sapper units were found in battalion and regimental strength. 
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Figure 2.   Organizational Chart for 9th Sapper Battalion (From: Westphal, 1971, p. 
10) 
 
C. TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT 
1.  Training 
According to all available documents, both captured and US produced 
intelligence, the personnel that became sappers possessed certain special characteristics 
that not all PLAF or PAVN soldiers possessed.  One document captured by US forces in 
1966 lists five attributes, either singularly or in groups, particular to the sapper: loyalty, 
bravery, modesty and patience to bear hardships and overcome difficulties, accuracy, as 
well as organization and discipline (Blakley, 1966, pp. 2-4).  Though these attributes 
were not quoted directly by every document dealing with sappers, a theme of sapper 
special characteristics is borne out by these qualities.  Political loyalty to the communist 
party was inherently necessary to be selected as a sapper.  As the war progressed and 
casualties piled up, political loyalty was overlooked at times during the recruiting process 
and not every sapper was communist.  Bravery was a trait that was needed by sappers to 
accomplish their mission of attacking inside enemy lines.  Ingenuity was a feature of 
every successful sapper mission.  The sapper had to use creativity to overcome hardship 
and difficulties often faced by forces operating within enemy held territory or fighting 
against forces that were technologically superior.  The sapper required a high degree of 
intelligence in order to operate in the independent manner that was required by sapper 
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operations.  Successful sappers and sapper operations necessitated a higher level of 
organizational skill and a greater degree of discipline than the ordinary PLAF or PAVN 
soldier needed.  Although not absolute, these sapper characteristics were institutional 
amongst Field, Naval, and Urban Sappers.    
The special training received by sappers was consistent for all three types of 
sappers: Field, Urban, and Naval. This training consisted of political indoctrination, 
reconnaissance and observation, movement methods and penetration techniques, as well 
as demolition and assault tactics.  Naval Sapper training only differed in that swimming 
and water movement was part of the training curriculum. Urban Sapper training diverged 
from Field Sapper training in that propaganda and assassination/terrorism techniques 
were heavily emphasized.  
a. Political Indoctrination 
Political indoctrination and training was an important component of the 
sappers training.  This training was accomplished either during the initial part of the 
sappers’ training, or on occasion during the preparation for infiltration into South 
Vietnam.  Political indoctrination consisted of lectures on the political situations in North 
Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the United States.  The importance and purpose of the 
revolution as well as the need for the destruction of the corrupt South Vietnamese regime 
and eviction of foreign aggressors, i.e., the US, was also a common theme during the 
training (Barnes, 1970, p. 4).  The training was normally carried out by one of the 
political officers/commissars assigned to the sapper school.  Not all sappers received 
political training as part of their overall sapper training.  Many of the part-time guerrillas 
trained as sappers did not have the time or trainers to conduct political indoctrination 
adequately.  It was not unusual for PLAF sappers to have little or no political 
indoctrination/training with the exception of PLAF Urban Sappers.  Urban Sappers 
received heavy amounts of political training while attending sapper schools. 
b.  Reconnaissance and Observation 
The very first procedure accomplished by the sapper was to reconnoiter 
their potential target or targets.  Sapper reconnaissance and observation skills were 
essential to any successful operation.  This skill-set included the proper use of a map and 
compass to effectively plan and coordinate an operation. The sapper also had to be very 
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proficient in the art of camouflage so that detection during observation was nearly 
impossible.  Once safely in position to observe the enemy, the sapper had to be able to 
correctly identify defensive positions, guard routines, fields of fire, defensive barriers, 
command and control centers, and other critical targets (VC/NVA Sapper Tactics, 
Organization, Armament, Training, and Effectiveness: ST69-10. 1969, p. 19).  This 
identification training was conducted through the use of pictures, models, sand-tables, 
and practical training.  .    
c. Movement Methods and Penetration Techniques 
It was critical for the sapper to learn how to move from position of cover 
and infiltrate through US/ARVN defensive positions without being detected.  This 
training included instruction in several ways of walking over hard ground such as 
walking on tiptoes, duck-walking, and crawling, as well as the ability to move across 
grassy areas, swamps, and water obstacles without being hindered or detected (Felix, 
Organization and Activities of the Communist Sapper Branch, pp. 14-17).  Once at the 
defensive perimeter, the sapper needed the training to navigate through the defenses.  
This included deactivating or disabling mines, moving through barbed wire or concertina, 
and getting past wooden or bamboo fencing (Felix, Organization and activities of the 
communist sapper branch, p. 17).   
d. Demolition and Assault Tactics 
Once the sapper made it inside the US/ARVN defensive perimeter, the 
next phase in the attack was the destruction with explosive of a target.  In order to 
accomplish the mission the sapper needed to be proficient with demolitions and assault 
tactics.  A basic necessity for sappers was the capability to handle explosives, either 
home-made or manufactured, correctly and safely.  The sapper was also instructed in the 
proper amounts of explosives that would destroy a specific target to ensure that enough 
explosives were carried by the assault cell (VC/NVA Sapper Tactics, Organization, 
Armament, Training, and Effectiveness: ST69-10. 1969, p. 22).  The sapper assault 






This training was accomplished in sapper schools found in North Vietnam, 
Laos, Cambodia, and parts of South Vietnam.  The sapper training schools in Cambodia 
and South Vietnam were administered by COSVN, either through the Sapper Office or 
eventually through the 429th Sapper Group while the schools in North Vietnam and Laos 
were directed from the PAVN High Command.  Training for sappers in these schools 
could last from three to 18 months depending on the current military situation.  The 
training time also depended on whether the unit was a part-time guerrilla force or a full-
time unit.  Another variable in the training of sapper units was that PAVN Field Sappers 
would move to a PLAF infantry unit designated to be retrained as a sapper unit.  This 
type of training normally took take place in the PLAF units’ operating area, and the 
training did not last nearly as long as sapper units trained in specialized sapper schools.  
An example of this difference in training was the D-2 Infantry Battalion in the Quang Tin 
Province of South Vietnam.  In 1970 six PAVN Field Sappers arrived in the D-2 base 
area to retrain the battalion in sapper methods. This training lasted almost two months 
(Anderson, 1970, p. 2).  The following is an example of a document captured in 1966 that 




Use of weapons 3 
Grenade Use 1 
Warning, patrols, guards 1 
Interior Affairs 1 
Reconnaissance Drill 2 
Individual and Cell Attack 2 
Squad Attack under art fire 1 
Chemistry and First Aid 2 
Mine Training 21 
Explosive Charges 25 
Tactics and Construction 26 
Revision and Control 5 
Total 93 
Table 1. Extract of a 1966 Training Program  (From: VC/NVA Sapper/Engineer 




The equipment of the Field Sapper was not uniform throughout the sapper forces.  
Some sapper units were heavily armed, more so than conventional infantry units of 
similar size, while other sapper units had the bare basics of weapons and equipment.  The 
AK-47 assault rifle and the TNT satchel charge were the two most common weapons 
found in the Field Sapper arsenal as well as some type of radio communications 
equipment.  According to numerous Order of Battle (OB) documents and prisoner 
debriefs, other types of weapons and equipment found amongst Field Sapper units were 
the B-40/41 Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG), bangalore torpedoes, RPK light-machine 
guns, various grenades, mines and pistols, assorted rifles, and sub-machineguns.  There 
were a number of Field Sapper units that had an organic heavy weapons section equipped 
with 57mm or 75mm recoilless rifles, 60mm or 82mm mortars, and in some cases even  
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flamethrowers (VC/NVA Sapper/Engineer Order of Battle: ST67-045, 1967, pp. C-I-9, C-
III-3).  This heavy weapons section had the responsibility of supporting a major sapper 
attack.  
 
D. TACTICS AND PROCEDURES 
The successful sapper, regardless of his specialty, whether in the field, the cities, 
or the water, followed certain principles best summarized in Chapter II of VC/NVA 
Sapper Tactics, Organization, Armament, Training, and Effectiveness: ST69-10 (1969, p. 
8).  The successful sapper made a comprehensive reconnaissance of the target in order to 
learn all enemy details before attacking.  Surprise was an essential element for any sapper 
attack and failure was almost certain without surprise.  Sapper attacks had to utilize speed 
of maneuver in order to attack before the more powerful enemy could react and defeat the 
sapper.  Sappers relied on numerous axis of attack so that the enemy could not pinpoint 
where the sapper elements were, and confusion and fear could be sown among the 
defenders.  Finally, sappers could not remain in the battle area for long and had to rapidly 
extricate themselves for survival.   
1.  Attacks on Garrisons and Headquarters 
An important element of the communist strategy was to destabilize the South 
Vietnamese regime in the countryside.  An excellent method to weaken the governments 
control outside of Saigon was to attack military garrison headquarters as well as 
provincial and local administrative centers.  With the exception of large cities like Hue or 
DaNang, PAVN and PLAF Field Sappers frequently targeted government facilities with 
the intent of destroying them.  Actions in the large cities such as this were undertaken by 
Urban Sappers. By taking these actions, the communist leadership hoped to show how 
weak the government was.  It was not unusual for Field Sappers to be assisted by local-
force guerrillas who acted as guides during attacks on government infrastructure.  Many 
of these facilities were well protected and very visible and their destruction gained the 
communists a large payoff for a small investment.   
Attacks on military command posts and garrisons were an attempt to immobilize 
US and ARVN forces by affecting command and control and diminishing morale.  
According to a document captured from the PLAF in 1966 concerning sapper activities, 
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the most vital objective in attacking enemy bases/headquarters was “to make the enemy 
feel that they are living unsafely in the South territory.  They must always be threatened 
by death and unsafe conditions.  They must also have no safe place to plan attacking us.” 
(National Liberation Front Military Operations, 1966, pp. 12-13).  These attacks on 
command centers could be in conjunction with larger-scale attacks such as the Tet 
Offensive in 1968, or individual attacks to hinder US and ARVN operations in a 
particular area.   
Before an attack on a government headquarters or military garrison, Field Sappers 
conducted a thorough reconnaissance of the target.  After reconnaissance, the sapper 
commander identified all enemy fighting positions as well as obstacles.  With this 
knowledge, a plan of attack was derived based on the number of sappers available for the 
mission.  The sappers were divided into three man cells and given their assignments of 
assault, destruction, or supporting fires.  The attack force would then infiltrate the target 
perimeter and execute the attack.  Immediately after the headquarters was destroyed, the 
sapper teams would exfiltrate the target area and then meet at a prearranged site to return 
to their base area. 
2. Attacks on Fuel and Ammunition Dumps 
Because US and ARVN forces often had a firepower advantage over communist 
troops, PAVN and PLAF leadership looked for way to decrease the firepower advantage. 
One way to do this was for communist forces to attack US and ARVN ammunition and 
fuel dumps, which were primary targets for Field Sappers.  These targets were well 
defended and gave little access to an enemy force. 
An attack on a fuel or ammunition dump was very similar to an attack on a 
headquarters.  Prior reconnaissance was necessary to identify weak points in the 
defensive perimeter and recognize defensive fighting positions.  The sapper leader that 
conducted the reconnaissance also planned which avenues of attack the sapper cells 
would utilize, as well as where the support cell would emplace to provide support fires 
for the attack.  This plan was based entirely on the number of sapper cells available for 
the attack as well as how diligent the defenders were.  During the attack, sappers would 
quietly penetrate the dump’s perimeter and then place multiple TNT satchel charges set 
to explode simultaneously after the attack cells retrograded the target area.  In many 
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instances, it was not unusual for the defenders to realize an attack was in progress until 
the satchel charges started to detonate (Foulke, 2003, p.2).  Sometimes the defenders 
were even unsure if the explosions were caused by the enemy or by some accidental 
means.  The support cell would only respond if the defenders discovered the attack cells.  
After the attack concluded, the cells would then meet at a prearranged site for movement 
back to their base area.  
3.  Attacks on Airfields 
Attacks by Field Sappers on airfields were almost identical to attacks on 
headquarters and dumps.  There was an extensive reconnaissance phase prior to the attack 
where all routes and defenses were noted.  The significant difference between the attacks 
on airfields and the previously mentioned attacks was that a larger force was needed.  
Airfields were more difficult targets because of their size, number of aircraft, and heavier 
in-depth defenses.  A larger fire support element was needed as well as more attack cells 
to target multiple aircraft and other targets of opportunity.  The attack cells generally 
relied upon stealth to get within the airfields perimeter and place their satchel charges.  
Once the charges were placed, the sappers would then egress from the airfield and move 
to their base area.  From examination of all available reports dealing with sappers, attacks  
upon airfields were the least successful in terms of withdrawal without casualties.  The 
evidence indicates that sapper attacks upon airfields were likely to be costly for the 
sapper and for US/ARVN forces. 
4.  Attacks on or Seizures of Bridges 
Another target attacked by Field Sappers was bridges found away from coastal 
areas or large waterways.  Not every bridge attack in rural South Vietnam was carried out 
by sappers but some were conducted by local-force guerrillas.  Nevertheless, when Field 
Sappers did target a bridge for destruction, the method was similar to Naval Sappers.  
The target was thoroughly reconnoitered with an attack plan based upon the size of the 
target, the defenses, and the targets accessibility.  The attack cell or cells stealthily 
approached the target either using terrain cover or using a waterway if available.  If the 
bridge was surrounded by a defensive perimeter, then the cells penetrated the perimeter in  
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the same manner as attack upon headquarters and dumps.  The TNT charges or mines 
were set to detonate and the cells withdrew to a designated spot.  From there the cells 
returned to their base area. 
During large scale offensives such as the Tet Offensive in 1968, the Spring 
Offensive in 1972, and the final attack on Saigon in 1975, bridge seizures became a focus 
of Field Sapper operations.  This was more the case in 1972 and 1975 because the PAVN 
military’s use of mechanized forces.  Seizure of these strategic targets allowed PAVN 
armor better access to ARVN targets and gave the communists an offensive advantage.  
During the final stages of the Vietnam War, PAVN sappers seized most of the crucial 
bridges in and around Saigon (Hoang, 2005, p. 230).  Loss of these bridges prevented the 
defenders from maintaining a secure perimeter around Saigon.  Because of this, PAVN 
armor was able to drive straight into the city and overrun critical facilities, including the 
Presidential Palace, which ended the war. 
5.  Attacks on Deployed Forces 
Sapper attacks upon forces in the field did happen, but such attacks were not the 
normal method of operations for the Field Sapper.  Deployed forces were not considered 
strategic or vital targets that sappers would normally target.  Because of their 
unpredictability, deployed forces were difficult to target.  Sappers normally would not 
have the necessary time required to conduct a complete reconnaissance of the target prior 
to attack.  These types of attacks would be haphazard at best and very risky.  Although 
sappers were not averse to high risk, the payoff needed to be high.  Attacking a unit 
operating in the field did not have a high payoff.  When sappers did attack deployed 
forces, the same methods as above were used.  The main difference according to all 
evidence available is that the fire support cell or cells would open fire once the defensive 
perimeter had been breached by the attack cells.  This caused confusion and distraction 
amongst the defenders and allowed the attack cells to locate their target, normally a 
command post, and place their explosives.  Withdrawal from this attack was extremely 
difficult for the sappers. 
6.  Support to Infantry Attacks 
Field Sappers provided direct support to conventional infantry attacks against 
US/ARVN fortified positions.  This support normally entailed a sapper force breaching a 
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defensive perimeter thus allowing a conventional infantry assault to proceed through the 
breach.  As with a sapper attack against deployed forces, this type of attack could be very 
hazardous to the sapper.  Once the sapper force breached the perimeter, usually through 
the use of bangalore torpedoes, the sappers’ most important asset, clandestinity, was lost.  
At this point in the attack, the sapper cells had endure the same dangers as the infantry 
once the defenders were alerted to the presence of an attack force.  If the base was not 
quickly overrun by the infantry force, all units were subject to the possibility of heavy 
casualties.   
7.  Attacks with Artillery 
Not only did some Field Sapper units possess light artillery, such as recoilless 
rifles or rocket launchers, to support sapper attacks, there were times when sapper units 
operated in conjunction with preplanned artillery barrages against US/ARVN targets or 
directly supported artillery units (The Impact of the Sapper on the Vietnam War, 1969, p. 
7).  In this role the sapper’s main function was to provide detailed reconnaissance data to 
the artillery unit to help pinpoint acceptable targets.  During the barrage, sappers were 
expected to observe the results of the attack and report back to the artillery unit.  
Although probable, there was no direct evidence that the sapper cells actually controlled 
the artillery barrage by adjusting the fires.   
Sappers could take advantage of an artillery barrage to attack a target such as a 
headquarters or dump.  The sapper commander would observe a number of barrages 
against the target installation to scrutinize how the defenders reacted.  If a weakness in 
the defense was detected then the sappers would use the artillery barrage to their 
advantage.  As the artillery barrage began, attack cells would penetrate the perimeter and 
advance to the target.  Once at the target, the cells would leave satchel charges and egress 
away from the target while the barrage was still ongoing.  Because the barrage alerted the 
defenders, the attack cells dealt with more risk than an attack using pure stealth. 
 
E. POTENTIAL LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 
1.  Advantages for Field Sappers 
• High payoff targets.  An obvious weakness of both US and ARVN forces 
was the large number of headquarters and ammunition dumps they needed 
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to support operations.  Not all of them could be adequately defended 
because of the limited number of troops.  PAVN and PLAF commanders 
recognized this weakness and attacked to sow confusion and cause 
paralysis. 
• Small numbers.  Because of superior technology and firepower, 
communist forces had to attack weak points.  Forces had to be developed 
that could penetrate enemy positions, attack the targets, and then withdraw 
without alerting the enemy.   
• Training.  It was nearly impossible to stop a well trained sapper when 
attacking under the right conditions.  So long as the sapper commander 
had the independence to conduct the attack as planned, the operation was 
likely to succeed. 
2.  Disadvantages for Field Sappers 
• Misuse. As with any specialized force, Field Sappers were prone to 
misuse.  Because of their high status, Field Sappers could find themselves 
being used as shock infantry against a tough target.  Sappers were 
inappropriate to attack and hold a target for long periods of time.  Sappers 
were also human and made mistakes.  If not allowed to rest and recuperate 
or forced to operate under abnormal constraints, Field Sappers were more 
likely to be discovered during an attack and sustain unacceptable 
casualties. 
• Technology deficit.  Communist forces could not hope to keep pace with 
the US/ARVN forces when it came to technology.  If the sapper leader did 
not conduct enough reconnaissance and identify the technological aspects 
of the defense, the attack force was bound to suffer needless casualties. 
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V. WATER / NAVAL SAPPER 
A. MISSION 
The Water or Naval Sapper was an important component of the Communist 
Sapper force.  Both the PLAF and PAVN used Naval Sappers during the conflict with the 
US and South Vietnam. As the name implies, the area of responsibility for the Naval 
Sapper was any water-body including ocean, estuary, canal, and river.  Naval Sappers 
were tasked with interdicting the US and Allied use of the multiple waterways found 
throughout South Vietnam.  Naval Sapper targets included commercial and military 
shipping, bridges, and piers, floating military bases, shore bases, power plants, and any 
other target that was near enough to water to allow access to the Naval Sapper (Watkins 
and Jahn, 1970, p. 1).  As the war progressed and sapper capabilities matured, land based 
objectives that included military bases, patrols, and lines-of-communication near water 
became targets for the Naval Sapper.  
 
B. ORGANIZATION 
Naval Sappers were organized just as other sapper units found in PLAF and 
PAVN forces with platoons, companies, and battalions.  The main difference between 
PLAF and PAVN Naval Sappers was that PLAF Naval Sappers tended to be less 
hierarchical and more centralized and flexible in their organization.  This flexibility was 
indicative of the fact that some PLAF Sapper units were Main Force while others were 
Local Force.  Examination of the interrogation debriefs and defector reports from former 
PLAF members showed that the PLAF referred to Naval Sappers in terms of “unit” and 
not company or battalion.  This is somewhat contradicted by the 1967 VC/NVA 
Sapper/Engineer Order of Battle produced by the Combined Intelligence Center, 
Vietnam.  Annex C of the document detailed the complete order of battle (OB) from 
regimental size down to independent squads found throughout South Vietnam.  The US 
produced document was very specific in detailing PLAF sapper units as battalions, 
companies, and platoons whereas former PLAF members were more imprecise when 
discussing PLAF Naval Sappers.  There were also instances of PLAF Field Sapper 
battalions with a Naval Sapper company or platoon within the organization.  These 
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composite battalions were typically found in or near large urban areas, such as Saigon, 
that lay close to a large river or along the coast.  In the areas around Saigon and deep in 
the Mekong Delta it wasn’t unusual for PLAF Naval Sapper platoons or squads to exist 
independently and report directly to the Military Region Headquarters.  These units were 
often local force or part-time guerrillas whose training and efficiency were not as high as 
the Main Force or full-time PLAF units. 
The highest tactical formation for PAVN Naval Sappers was the battalion.  The 
battalion headquarters normally consisted of a commander, executive officer, a political 
officer, and a small support staff if the manpower existed.  The support staff was 
typically responsible for logistics, medical support, and any other support as needed.  In 
some of the larger Naval Sapper battalions, the political officer had an assistant.  The size 
of the PAVN Naval Sapper battalion ranged anywhere from 75 to 300 members.  The 
Naval sapper battalion was organized with two to three sapper companies each 
numbering 30 to 100 members.  Each company had a commander, executive officer, and 
political officer with a small support staff.  The company was made up of two or more 
platoons usually numbering 10 or more men each.  Within the platoon, two combat cells 
of two to five men existed.  It was the combat cell that conducted missions against US 
and ARVN forces.  One organizational feature that seemed to be consistent for all Naval 
Sapper units was that there was no absolute organizational standard.  No two units had 
the same make up. 
The following schematic of the 8th Naval Sapper Battalion, Special Region 4 
(Quang Tri-Hue City area) best represented the typical structure of Naval Sapper 
Battalions found in South Vietnam (Noyes, 1971, p. 8).  It was a small battalion with a 
headquarters element and two small Sapper companies.  The third company was an 
infantry company recently added to the Table of Organization.  It was probable that this 
third infantry company would be converted to a Sapper company or that the infantry 
company would be used to augment the Sapper companies in large-scale attacks. 
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Figure 3.   Order of Battle for 8th Naval Sapper Battalion (From: Noyes, 1971, p. 8) 
 
C. EQUIPMENT 
PLAF and PAVN Naval Sappers used equipment that was unique to their special 
mission needs as well as equipment that was common to other types of sappers.  The AK-
47, RPG, and TNT satchel charges were universal amongst all communist sappers.  
PAVN Naval Sappers that operated in northern South Vietnam were more heavily armed 
and were equipped with more sophisticated anti-shipping or water mines.  According to 
OB reports found within the VC/NVA Sapper/Engineer Order of Battle produced by the 
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, many PLAF Naval Sapper units utilized TNT 
charges, 60mm and 82mm mortars, and recoilless rifles to attack shipping. 
Naval Sapper swimmers used various methods to attack waterborne vessels.  The 
three most frequently utilized ways to deliver the swimmer were through snorkeling, the 
sampan, and Self-Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus (SCUBA).  The most 
primitive and common swimmer method was to hollow out bamboo and use it as a 
snorkel.  This procedure allowed the swimmer to blend in with the typical shoreline 
found in Vietnam and provided the swimmer with an almost unlimited source of 
snorkeling material.  Using snorkels did have some inherent disadvantages for the 
swimmer.  He was forced to stay close to the surface of the water, thereby potentially 
exposing himself, and if seen by an alert sentry, the swimmer could not stay submerged 
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for a long enough period of time to escape.  If not using snorkels or after exit, the next 
most used method of swimmer insertion was from a sampan.  Sampans were the most 
commonly found waterborne vessel in Vietnam and so were the perfect covert insertion 
vehicle for the swimmer.  The sampan allowed the swimmer to extend his range from the 
main base and carry more or heavier gear.  Sampans also blended in with “normal” 
waterway traffic which made them the perfect reconnaissance platform for the swimmer.  
The main disadvantage was that sampans were easily outclassed by US/ARVN patrol 
vessels and could not escape if discovered.  A modern method of insertion by the 
swimmer was by SCUBA.  On February 5th 1968 the first use of SCUBA by Naval 
Sappers was discovered and identified (The Impact of the Sapper on the Vietnam War, 
1969, p. 15).  Although limited in use during the war, the introduction of SCUBA gear 
greatly enhanced the capabilities of Naval Sappers to clandestinely attack targets 
throughout South Vietnam.   
 
D.    TACTICS AND PROCEDURES 
The Naval Sapper employed many techniques to attack enemy targets.  These 
attacks ranged from water ambushes, placement of explosives onto waterborne vessels, 
and destruction of enemy bridges.  Shore based targets near water such as airfields, 
storage sites, and bases were attacked identically the same way as by Field and Urban 
Sappers.  The main difference was the method of insertion of the attacking team.  Just as 
with all other types of sappers, Naval Sappers relied on prior reconnaissance of the target 
or target area. 
1.  Water Ambush 
The water ambush was composed of two different operations.  The simplest and 
least risky water ambush called for the placement of an explosive charge onto the bottom 
of a waterway.  Once placed, there were two ways for the explosive to be detonated.  The 
charge could be set off by contact with a boat, or the charge could be exploded by 
command detonation.  Detonation by contact with the boat was the safest technique of 
water ambush but did not allow for a choice of target that command detonation allowed.  
The risk to the swimmer cell was minimal when leaving a contact explosive, but 
substantially increased when command detonating a charge. 
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The second and riskier water ambush technique was for a number of swimmer 
cells to engage a target from the shoreline.  A normal ambush began with the use of an 
underwater charge, typically command detonated.  Once the charge was detonated, one 
swimmer cell then engaged the target with RPGs while another swimmer cell attacked 
with recoilless rifle fire or machine gun fire.  When the required damage was completed 
or the return fire grew too heavy, the swimmer cells then melted away into the terrain.  
This type of ambush could be quite deadly to the defenders especially when they were 
not vigilant.  If the defenders were vigilant or support was close by, then the swimmer 
cells could be at great risk of casualties. 
2.  Waterborne Vessel Attack 
An attack on a waterborne vessel called for the placement of an explosive charge 
directly onto the hull of the target.  The swimmer had several ways to accomplish the task 
but first had to arrive at the target covertly.  Depending on where the vessel was moored, 
the swimmer had to get close enough to the target with his explosive charge.  This was 
accomplished by swimming from shore or being dropped off by sampan.  Once close 
enough to the target, the normal method was to swim using a snorkel and drag the 
explosive charge to the vessel. The two man swimmer cell either carried an explosive 
charge individually or assisted each other to carry a single large charge.  The cell 
members normally tied a rope between themselves to facilitate the attack and keep each 
other from becoming separated (Watkins and Jahn, 1970, p. 13).  The two swimmers 
would approach the vessel and try and catch the anchor chain between them using their 
rope.  Once they were able to catch the anchor chain, the swimmers could then maneuver 
and place the charge or charges against the hull of the target.  This technique worked 
against all types of vessels regardless of whether they were moored in a river, along a 
pier, or out on the coast.  Once the explosive was attached, either magnetically or tied to 
the hull, the fuse was activated.  This could be command detonated or time-delayed.  
Time-delayed seemed to be the preferred method as it required no more activity by the 
swimmer cell. 
3.  Bridge Attack 
For the Field and Urban Sapper there was just too much risk involved in attacking 
a bridge over land, where it was best defended.  Because of that risk, bridge attacks 
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became the specialty of the Naval Sapper.  The standard technique of the swimmer cell to 
attack a bridge was to enter the water upstream of the bridge and be carried by the current 
to the bridge.  The cell members could tie themselves together with a rope or maintain 
visual contact with each other until reaching the bridge.  One of the simplest covert 
methods used to float to the target was to grab a piece of floating debris found in the river 
and utilize it for cover.  Just as in attacking a waterborne vessel, the swimmer cell had to 
carry the explosive charge individually or together to the target.  Once the swimmer cell 
managed to get the charge to the bridge pilings, it was just a matter of attaching the 
explosives and setting the fuse.  As Naval Sapper counter-measures increased around the 
vulnerable pilings, the swimmer sapper placed larger amounts of explosives below the 
center of a span.  Once detonated, the explosive caused a large water spout that had the 
potential to damage or destroy that span (Watkins and Jahn, 1970, p. 27).   
 
E. POTENTIAL LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 
1.  Advantages for Water Sappers 
• Target rich environment.  South Vietnam had considerable boat traffic 
because of the large number of waterways.  The large number of 
waterways increased the governments’ reliance on bridges and resupply 
vessels.  The ability to insert swimmer cells near their target was made 
easier by the number of boats in use and the criticality of boat traffic for 
the Government of South Vietnam.  
• Economy of force. A small swimmer cell or group of cells could cause 
considerable damage.  As an example, not including water ambushes or 
bridge attacks, between 1962 and 1969 there were 88 successful swimmer 
attacks against shipping which resulted in the loss of only 20 swimmers 
for all attacks whether successful or not (Watkins and Jahn, 1970, p. 5).  In 
terms of swimmer loss to shipping loss, for every four successful 
operations one swimmer was lost, the payoff was extremely advantageous 
for the Naval Sapper. 
• Targets hard to defend.  By their nature, waterborne vessels, bridges, and 
waterways were extremely difficult to defend.  As the South Vietnamese 
grew to rely on the bridges and waterways, the greater the vulnerability of 
these potential targets became obvious.  Technology could help tilt the 
balance towards the US/ARVN position, but only long enough for the 





2.  Disadvantages for Water Sappers 
• The swimmer is slow and less than maneuverable.  Because the swimmer 
must carry the explosive charge on his own or with a cell member, a fast 
moving current or choppy sea could impede the progress of the swimmer 
cell.   
• New technological defenses.  The US/ARVN military constantly 
developed new technological defenses that had to be overcome by the 
swimmer.  This placed even more reliance on pre-attack reconnaissance.  
If proper reconnaissance was not conducted or the swimmer cell had 
already launched and something about the target or defenses changed, the 
attack was likely to fail. 
• Night restriction.  The primary time for all attacks except water ambushes 
was at night.  Darkness would inhibit the ability of the swimmer to 
successful maneuver to the intended target.  Once the opportunity was 
missed, the swimmer had to return to base and re-plan the attack. 
• Misuse.  Just as with all other sappers, Naval Sappers could be misused by 
attacking the wrong targets such as heavily defended bases better left to 
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IV. URBAN SAPPER / SPECIAL ACTION UNIT 
A.    MISSION 
The missions of the Urban Sapper or Special Action Unit were very diverse.  
Urban Sappers had to be able to attack bases and installations within large cities just as 
Field Sappers attacked the same targets outside of the large cities.  Another significant 
mission was armed propaganda actions against military and civilian populations deep 
within the enemy’s rear.  Special Action Units were also expected to build clandestine 
organizations inside enemy held cities for the purposes of sabotage, political agitation, 
and intelligence gathering (PLAF-PAVN Special Action and Sapper Teams, 1966, p. 15).  




Of the three types of sappers, Urban Sappers had the least organizational 
structure.  US order-of-battle intelligence specialists tried to place Special Action Units 
into an organizational hierarchy in order to fit into the conventional intelligence process.  
This was incorrect because there was no firm organizational construct for this type of 
unit.  The missions assigned to Urban Sappers could be accomplished by individuals or 
groups of cells depending on the target.  All evidence indicated that a formal command 
structure existed, but that the underlying units were fluid.  This flexible structure allowed 
the unit to remain anonymous under police pressure while maintaining its ability to 









Figure 4.   Organizational Chart for C-10 Urban Sapper Battalion. (From: VC/NVA 
Sapper/Engineer Order of Battle: ST67-045, 1967, p. C-III-7) 
 
Because of size limitations and clandestine necessity, only those who were 
considered loyal to the party were recruited into Urban Sapper units.  This included not 
only men, but also women (National Liberation Front Military Operations, 1966, p. 14).  
Women were better able to move through security checkpoints and were less visible on 
the street because of the fact that many young males were away fighting in the war.  
Although party loyalty was considered very important for the Urban Sapper, this 
characteristic was not always a priority if, as during the Tet Offensive, large numbers of 
casualties were absorbed by Special Action Units.  In that case, replacement of casualties 
sometimes took priority over party devotion. 
 
C. EQUIPMENT 
The Special Action Unit was equipped in the same manner as the Field Sapper 
with the exception that lighter weapons were the rule.  Urban Sappers had little use for 
heavy weapons as they were hard to conceal and difficult to transport in a crowded urban 
environment.  The preponderance of weapons carried by the Urban Sapper were small, 
such as pistols, AK-47’s with folding stocks, grenades, TNT and C4, RPGs, and small 
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mines.  Urban Sappers also used field glasses and small radios.  Although potentially 
useful for all sapper units, employment of ARVN or government uniforms and equipment 
to infiltrate to the target easily were utilized by Special Action Units (VC Document 
captured 6 February, 1967, pp. 12-13).   
 
D.    TACTICS AND PROCEDURES 
1. Terrorism 
The use of terrorism by the PLAF was one of the earliest forms of insurgency in 
Vietnam.  The communists used terror against the South Vietnamese from the mid-
1950’s until the fall of South Vietnam in 1975.  A 1967 US Embassy paper on PLAF 
terrorism gave five reasons why the tactic of terrorism was used: 1) Build morale within 
the PLAF, 2) Advertise the movement, 3) Disorientation and psychological isolation, 4) 
Eliminate the opposition, and 5)Provoke the South Vietnamese government (The Viet 
Cong Use of Terror, 1967, pp. 50-53).  As an underground movement, the PLAF needed 
to show the population of South Vietnam and the movement’s own members that it could 
successfully attack the enemy.  The PLAF hoped that the people of South Vietnam would 
become fearful, weak, and angry provoking a change in government.  Any strong reprisal 
by the South Vietnamese government would be taken out on the population, thereby 
turning them towards the communists.  However, not every terrorist act was conducted 
by Urban Sappers, but also by other elements of the PLAF. 
The Urban Sapper conducted terrorism in the cities through a number of methods.  
The simplest form of terrorism practiced was kidnapping.  The subject of the kidnapping 
was normally a government official, teacher, or other individual with high status in the 
society.  If a ransom was paid, the subject might be released or murdered.  Another 
method was to throw grenades or other small explosive.  This was normally done to 
attack small police or military posts, government offices, or US sites.  Though the 
physical damage was usually insignificant, the psychological damage to citizens could be 
high.  Finally, the Special Action Unit would use a large bomb, similar to either a car-
bomb or a package type of bomb.  This type of attack inflicted the most significant 
damage and casualties of all the methods of terrorism.  Before the bombing, the target  
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would be examined to note any security, avenues of attack and escape, and the best time 
for attack.  The member or cell then placed the bomb, normally on a timer, and then 
escaped from the target area.   
2.  Assassination 
Although a subset of terrorism, the use of assassination by the communists was an 
insidiously effective technique in the struggle against the South Vietnamese government.  
Assassination was one of the earliest forms of insurgency conducted by the PLAF since 
the mid-1950’s.  One PLAF apparatus, though not exclusively, that carried out 
assassinations was the Special Action Unit.  According to The Viet Cong Tactic of 
Assassination published in 1971, the following were motivations behind this technique: 
1) Elimination of opposition leadership, 2) Terrorize the rural mass into granting support 
to the guerrillas, 3) Isolation of the population from the South Vietnamese government, 
4) Damage the reputation of the South Vietnamese government, and 5) Weaken 
organizations and social classes that potentially threaten PLAF control (The Viet Cong 
Tactic of Assassination, pp. 1-2).  Once a prospective target was identified by the party 
apparatus, surveillance was conducted to pinpoint the most favorable time to attack.  This 
surveillance could be short or last a number of days depending on how much security the 
target had.   
3.  Propaganda 
Although not a primary mission for the Special Action Unit, the dissemination of 
propaganda was an essential task in the struggle to control the human element on the 
urban battlefield.  The methods applied to spread the communist propaganda varied but 
were normally word of mouth, leaflets, and actions such as terrorism.  Themes central to 
the propaganda effort: 1) Educate the masses about communist victories, 2) Imply that 
dissension against and amongst the government of South Vietnam has grown, 3) Portray 
the struggle as anti-colonial, nationalist against the US and their puppets, and 4) Suggest 
that newly liberated areas are prosperous (Additional Guidance for the Propaganda 
Mission during the Present Phase, 1964, pp. 2-4).  Because the Urban Sapper operated 




4.  Espionage 
Espionage was a role well suited for the Urban Sapper, but was not a key mission 
area.  Because of their training in surveillance and observation, sappers were better able 
to gather intelligence against the South Vietnamese government and military as well as 
any US activity.  The intelligence gathered could be either tactical in nature to sustain a 
forthcoming military operation or strategic support to COSVN and the PAVN High 
Command.  Another collection technique for the sapper was to infiltrate into a 
government or military organization.  Once inside the organization, the sapper had easy 
access to data that could be gathered and then relayed back for use at higher levels.  
Sappers also maintained clandestine support networks that could be leveraged to supply 
intelligence about the population in specific parts of a city. This information was used to 
gauge the mood of the population regarding both the communists and the South 
Vietnamese government. 
5.  Attacks on Government/Military Installations 
Just as Field Sappers could attack South Vietnamese and US installations, Special 
Action Units also attacked the same types of installations within the large urban areas.  
The procedures were generally the same with an emphasis on prior reconnaissance.  After 
a thorough reconnaissance, an attack plan was drawn up for the number of cells required 
to accomplish the objective.  That attack was carried out and follow-up forces relieved 
the sappers.  The difference between Field Sapper attacks such as this and the Special 
Action Unit attacks on installations was that attempted seizures of installations in large 
urban areas only occurred during large-scale offensives such as Tet or the final attack on 
Saigon in 1975.  It was much too dangerous for the Special Action Unit to seize a 
government installation unless other large infantry units were to relieve the sappers.  
During the times when no large offensives were ongoing, the primary focus of the 
Special Action unit was terrorism.  
 
E. POTENTIAL LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 
1.  Advantages for Urban Sappers 
• Working on the inside.  Special Action Units enjoyed an advantage over 
other sapper units because they were able to operate in areas considered  
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safe by the South Vietnamese government.  Movement within the large 
cities was often uninhibited because it was almost impossible for the 
government to manage movement inside the city.  
• Economy of force. These small sapper units were able to cause 
considerable damage and confusion to the government.  It was extremely 
hard to defend against an enemy that moved easily amongst the 
population.  The cost to the PLAF was minimal so long as the Special 
Action Units were not misused. 
• Tactical and Strategic implications.  The successful results of Urban 
Sapper operations often had tactical and strategic implications.  When the 
government of South Vietnam was unable to stop a terrorist action or 
assassination, the people lost confidence.  If an organization was doing 
well against the communists, it became a target of the sappers.  Once 
attacked then that organization was no longer effectively conducting its 
mission. 
2.  Disadvantages for Urban Sappers 
• Security.  Special Action Units required a higher level of security that 
other type of sappers.  In order to survive, the sapper had to rely upon a 
small number of support cadre.  If the support cadre or another sapper 
were captured, the clandestine network was easily unraveled.  
• Misuse.  Urban Sappers did not have the numbers or firepower to seize 
and hold an objective without receiving quick support from larger units.  
In offensives such as Tet, sappers were required to seize objectives but 
were not relieved quickly enough and were wiped out. 
• Logistics.  Special Action Units had difficulty maintaining the needed 
quantities of supplies such as TNT because of the security environment.  
Planning operations required much long-term thought in order that one 





Communist Sappers used during the Vietnam War definitely were a form of 
special operations force.  Although they came into existence because the type of warfare 
the communists were engaged upon dictated their need, PAVN and PLAF Sappers 
quickly set themselves apart from all other types of communist military forces.  Just as 
any other military force, the three types of sapper forces had strengths and weaknesses.  
Sapper operations were often successful because the strengths of the sapper were 
maximized, and their weaknesses minimized. 
The flexible organization the sappers fielded was one of their most effective 
attributes.  According to their operating procedures, the size of the attacking force was 
dictated by mission requirements.  Depending on necessity and type of unit, the size of 
the attack force could range from an individual sapper, up to a three man cell, or a task 
organization of company size or larger.  The adaptable structure of the various sapper 
units allowed for the targeting of virtually any US or South Vietnamese objective. There 
was no type of unit or post that was immune to attack by sappers.  This organizational 
flexibility allowed sappers to meet the needs of higher headquarters on an ever changing 
battlefield.  
Another sapper characteristic that was extremely important was their ability to 
stealthily recon any potential target.  What was even more important for this 
reconnaissance effort was that the mission commander was responsible for actually 
putting eyes on the target.  This method of requiring the commander, not necessarily the 
unit commander, to conduct the pre-attack reconnaissance ensured that the mission 
planning took into account all possibilities and that the leader was most knowledgeable 
about the target.  Sapper operations were rarely conducted without thorough 
reconnaissance, and those that did not carry out a methodical reconnaissance were more 
likely to fail.     
The high level of training found amongst many sappers also contributed to their 
successes.  Although not true for every sapper, the greater depth and length of sapper 
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training was found in all three types of sapper units.  This high proficiency allowed the 
sappers to carry out missions that most US and ARVN members considered impossible 
or foolhardy.  Their levels of training also allowed the sappers to be competent at many 
different skill sets.  This competency gave the sappers a greater degree of flexibility 
during an actual operation.  If one cell member became a casualty, then another member 
of the cell could take over the casualty’s responsibilities.  Another training benefit was 
that sappers had the skills that allowed them to operate autonomously.  Fewer ties to 
other units permitted the sappers to take on assignments without worrying about support, 
as well as to maintain secrecy. 
Another factor that guaranteed a higher degree of success for the sapper was that 
South Vietnam was a target- rich environment.  The South Vietnamese government and 
military had no capability to provide adequate security for all potential targets found 
within the country.  The US military was not in a better position than the South 
Vietnamese.  For every combat unit, a large base existed to provide support to that unit.  
These bases and their infrastructure made ideal targets for the sapper.  US and ARVN 
combat units were over extended trying to counter communist guerrilla and conventional 
operations.  When US and South Vietnamese government programs, such as Civil 
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) had any success, they 
became priority targets for sapper operations.  Once the communist military authorities 
recognized the value of sapper units in relation to the large number of high value targets, 
the number of sapper organizations increased and spread throughout communist 
controlled areas. 
One possible argument against the assertion that PAVN and PLAF sappers were 
Special Operations Forces, has been that Vietnamese Sappers were just combat engineers 
fulfilling unique requirements.  The author contends that the communist military self-
identified this force as sappers to mislead their enemy.  The US and ARVN military 
bought in to this deception and treated sappers as essentially engineering units.  It seems 
that part of the reason for this was that the US military cannot readily accept the fact that 
a third world Asian nation fighting a non-traditional war could possibly employ special 
operations forces against the US.  To compare Vietnamese Sappers with US Special 
Forces during the war is incorrect because the two forces had separate roles in the 
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conflict.  The sappers were primarily concerned with direct action, while the US Army 
Special Forces focus was on training indigenous forces.  What is interesting is to note the 
similarities between Vietnamese Sappers during the Vietnam War and US Special Forces 
in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  The correlation between the two forces is 
direct action and surveillance/reconnaissance.  The necessities of the conflict, coupled 
with the skills of the forces, have been the reason for their role in the two conflicts.  The 
same skeptics that would argue that Vietnamese Sappers were not special operations 
forces would have to grudgingly acknowledge that US Special Forces as used today in 
GWOT are not Special Operations Forces.  As this is not the case and US Special Forces 
are just that, then one must consider Vietnamese Sappers a form of special operations 
forces.  
 
B. LESSONS FOR TODAY 
The single most important lesson that comes from the US experience with 
Vietnamese Sappers is that the enemy can not be underestimated.  Just because the US 
military faces non-traditional military forces during conflict, it should not assume that the 
enemy will have less capabilities than a modern opponent.  American hubris regarding its 
expertise in the use of special operations forces must not blind the military to the fact that 
a Third World military has an advantage when conducting special operations on its own 
soil.   
Better technology is not always the answer to this type of problem.  The 
American military has always prided itself on countering any threat with improved 
technology.  The US experience in Vietnam showed that this was flawed.  On numerous 
occasions, the Vietnamese Sapper was able to modify their methods to simply overcome 
any newly developed defensive countermeasure.  When fighting an opponent who has a 
technological disadvantage, the enemy will always adapt his methods to overcome the 
high tech US advantage.  The solution is to use technology, but to rely on the human 
factor, both through US forces and indigenous security forces. 
Another lesson to be learned from Vietnamese Sapper operations is the benefit 
that organization provided the Vietnamese in operating against the US and ARVN.  The 
better the PLAF and PAVN Special Operations Forces organized, the more effective the 
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force as a whole became.  This organizational ability allowed the Vietnamese to learn 
from successful and unsuccessful operations, to share tactics and procedures, and pass on 
tips and lessons learned throughout the organization.  In essence, the greater extent to 
which the sappers organized themselves, the more dangerous the force became for US 
and ARVN forces.  Today, it is imperative for US forces to understand the type of 
organizations that it battles, as well as how mature the organizations have become.  The 
more effectively the US can destabilize enemy organizations, the less of a threat that they 
can become. 
The final lesson to be learned is the need to recognize one’s own centers of 
vulnerability.  The weaker enemy will always attempt to strike at points that have the 
greatest chance of causing the most damage.  US reliance on technology for command 
and control gives the enemy a perfect opportunity to attack using SOF.  Because 
resources are finite, the US military must concentrate its command and control equipment 
into command posts, which are very obvious as to their importance.  Because the US 
military has become so thinly stretched due to multiple conflicts, the reliance upon 
contractors and third country nationals to provide logistical support makes them clear 
targets.  One method that an insurgent or guerrilla force could use to indirectly attack the 
US military logistical system would be by removing, through terror, contractors and third 
country nationals. This type of action would cripple US military operations in GWOT.  
Just as during the Vietnam War, US airbases and ammunition depots are extremely 
vulnerable to attack by SOF. What better way for the enemy to gain positive propaganda 
and hurt the US, but by attacking and causing significant damage to American logistics 
facilities. Enemy special operations forces are not supermen and can be stopped as long 
as they are recognized for who they are and what operations they are actually capable of 
conducting. 
43 
LIST OF REFERENCES  
A Military Region Sapper Team’s Surprise Attack on the TACAN Site on Pha-Thi 
Mountain.  (1996). Chapter translated from the book entitled Military Region 2, 
Several Battles during the War of Liberation 1945-1975, Volume III.  Hanoi: 
PAVN Publishing House.  Vietnam Archive.  Texas Tech University. 
Additional Guidance for the Propaganda Mission during the Present Phase. (1964).  
Translated captured document.  Retrieved 8 May 2005, from 
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Anderson, Kenneth J.  (Prepared by) (1970). Sapper Training in the RVN.  CMIC 
USMACV. History of the Vietnam War on Microfilm.  Retrieved 19 May 2004, 
from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Barnes, Milton L. (Prepared by) (1970). H-11 Sapper Training School.  CMIC 
USMACV. History of the Vietnam War on Microfilm. Retrieved 19 May 2004, 
from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Blakley, Raymond J. (Prepared by) (1966).  Indispensable Virtues of a Reconnaissance-
Sapper Soldier.  CDEC USMACV.  Retrieved 24 April 2005 from 
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Felix, Edward A. (Prepared by) (1971).  Organization and Activities of the Communist 
Sapper Branch.  CDEC COMUSMACV.  Translation of a J2, Joint General Staff, 
Army of the Republic of Vietnam study.  History of the Vietnam War on 
Microfilm.  Retrieved 6 May 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Felix, Edward A. (Prepared by) (1971). Report on an Oct 69 Sapper Conference held by 
Headquarters, SVNLA.  CDEC COMUSMACV.  History of the Vietnam War on 
Microfilm.  Retrieved 24 April 2005, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Foullke, William. (2003). 3rd Ordnance Depot Blown up VC.  Letter detailing pictures the 
author took of the depot after the attack.  Retrieved 13 July 2004, from 
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
FM 3-34 Engineer Operations., (2004).  Headquarters Department of the Army.   
Ho, Khang. (2001). The Tet Mau Than 1968 Event in South Vietnam. Hanoi, Vietnam: 
The’ Gioi Publishers. 
Hoang, Thai Van. (2005). How South Vietnam Was Liberated.  Hanoi, Vietnam: The’ 
Gioi Publishers. 
Hoang, Ngoc Lung. (1978). The General Offensives of 1968-69.  General Research 
Corporation.  Retrieved 2 June 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
44 
McRaven, William H. (1993).  The Theory of Special Operations, Thesis retrieved 15 
May 2004 from http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/93Jun_McRaven.pdf 
National Liberation Front Military Operations.  (1966).  Translated captured documents 
concerning sapper and special action units with Ninh Thuan province.  History of 
the Vietnam War on Microfilm.  Retrieved 6 May 2004, from 
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Noyes, Jeffry C. (Prepared by) (1971).  Order of Battle of the 8th Naval Sapper Bn, SR-4.  
CMIC USMACV.  History of the Vietnam War on Microfilm.  Retrieved 6 May 
2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Order of Battle Study ST67-027:  VC/NVA Attacks on Fixed Installations.  (1967).  
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam.  Vietnam Archive.  Texas Tech 
University. 
PAVN/PLAF Order of Battle data:  PLAF Tay Do I.  (1972).  CMIC USMACV.  History 
of the Vietnam War on Microfilm.  Vietnam Archive.  Texas Tech University. 
Pike, Douglas. (1986). PAVN—People’s Army of Vietnam. Novato, CA: Presidio Press. 
PLAF-PAVN Special Action and Sapper Teams.  (1966).  Translated from captured 
enemy document titled: A Draft of the Proposed Development and Utilization of 
Reconnaissance, Sapper, and Special Action Sections in 1964 and 1965.  History 
of the Vietnam War on Microfilm.  Retrieved 19 May 2004, from 
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Sapper Leader Course (2004. November 22).  US Army Engineer School.  Retrieved 22 
November 2004, from 
http://www.wood.army.mil/sapper/SapperPage_files/SapperLeaderCourse.htm 
The Impact of the Sapper on the Vietnam War.  (1969). Combined Intelligence Center-
MACV. History of the Vietnam War on Microfilm.  Retrieved 19 May 2004, from 
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
 The Viet Cong Tactic of Assassination.  (1971).  Saigon: Joint US Public Affairs Office.  
Retrieved 17 August 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
The Viet Cong Use of Terror.  (1967). Saigon: United States Mission in Vietnam.  
Retrieved 10 August 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Tourison, Sedgwick D. (1995). Secret Army, Secret War: Washington’s Tragic Spy 
Operation in North Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. 
Turley, William S. (1986). The Second Indochina War-A Short Political and Military 
History, 1954-1975.  Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
45 
United States Army Special Operations Command Home Page. (2005).  Retrieved 6 June 
2005, from http://www.soc.mil/hqs/hqs_home.htm 
Vallentiny, Edward. (Prepared by) (1968). The Fall of Site 85.  Project CHECO Report.  
Directorate of Operations Analysis, HQ, Pacific Air Force.  Vietnam Archive.  
Texas Tech University. 
VC Document captured 6 February, 1967 by US 25th Infantry Division during Operation 
Cedar Falls.  Translated document dealing with Urban Sapper Movement.  
Retrieved 6 May 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
VC/NVA Sapper/Engineer Order of Battle: ST67-045.  (1967).  Combined Intelligence 
Center, Vietnam.  Vietnam Archive.  Texas Tech University. 
VC/NVA Sapper Tactics, Organization, Armament, Training, and Effectiveness: ST69-10.  
(1969).  Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam.  Vietnam Archive.  Texas Tech 
University. 
Viet Cong Political Geography of South Vietnam, January 1971.  (1971). Retrieved 26 
February, 2005, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Watkins, G. C., and Jahn, E. R. (1970).  Countering the Swimmer/Sapper.  San Francisco, 
CA:  Commander US Naval Forces, Vietnam, Operations Analysis Branch.  
Retrieved 13 July 2004, from http://infotrac.galegroup.com 
Westphal, Gerald W. (Prepared by) (1971).  OB of the 9th Sapper Battalion.  CMIC 
USMACV. Retrieved 22 April 2005 from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Windrow, Martin.  (2004). The Last Valley—Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in 
Vietnam.  Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press. 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
47 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
7AF Local Base Defense Operations: July 1965-December 1968.  (1968).  Project 
CHECO Report.  Directorate of Operations Analysis, HQ, Pacific Air Force.  
Vietnam Archive.  Texas Tech University. 
Abbey, Thomas G.  (Prepared by) (1971).  Attack on Cam Ranh.  Project Contemporary 
Historical Examination of Current Operations (CHECO) Report.  Directorate of 
Operations Analysis, HQ, Pacific Air Force.  Vietnam Archive.  Texas Tech 
University. 
Baker, Brian M. (Prepared by) (1969).  VC Sapper and Political Training. CMIC 
USMACV. History of the Vietnam War on Microfilm. Retrieved 19 May 2004, 
from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Brewer, Ralph J. (Prepared by) (1970).  VCI of the Sapper High Command, R.  CMIC 
USMACV.  History of the Vietnam War on Microfilm.  Retrieved 6 May 2004, 
from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Buckalew, Ralph E. (Prepared by) (1971). Order of Battle of the T-89 Sapper Bn, Front 
44.  CMIC USMACV.  History of the Vietnam War on Microfilm.  Retrieved 6 
May 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Caughey, Thomas F. (Prepared by) (1970).  Order of Battle of the 5th Sapper Bn, 16th 
sapper Div.  CMIC USMACV.  History of the Vietnam War on Microfilm.  
Retrieved 6 May 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
City affairs congress held by the VC Region 5 Party Committee.  (1972).  Translated 
captured document.  Vietnam Archive.  Texas Tech University. 
Conley, Michael C. (1968). Communist thought and Viet Cong Tactics.  Asian Survey, 
Vol. 8, No. 3, (March 1968), pp. 206-222.  Retrieved 11 May 2004, from 
http://www.jstor.org 
Dannaker Jr., Robert E. (Prepared by) (1971).  Sapper Tactics of the C-3 Sapper 
Company, Ben Tre(VC) City Unit, Ben Tre(VC) Province Unit, MR-2.  CMIC 
USMACV.  History of the Vietnam War on Microfilm.  Retrieved 6 May 2004, 
from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Dannaker Jr., Robert E. (Prepared by) (1971). Sapper Training of the C-2 Sapper 
Company, Tay Ninh Province Unit, R.  CMIC USMACV. History of the Vietnam 
War on Microfilm. Retrieved 19 May 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Davidson, Phillip B. (1988). Vietnam at War--The History 1946-1975.  Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
48 
Dees, Joseph L. (1968). The Viet Cong Attack that Failed. Department of State News 
Letter.  Retrieved 13 July 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Dennision, John W., and Porter, Melvin F. (1971)  Local Base Defense in RVN January 
69-June 71.  Project CHECO Report.  Directorate of Operations Analysis, HQ, 
Pacific Air Force.  Vietnam Archive.  Texas Tech University. 
Development of City Sapper Activities in the Past Few Years.  (1968).  Translated from 
document prepared by Staff Department of COSVN.  Retrieved 6 May 2004,  
from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Dukate, Carl R. (Prepared by) (1972).  Tactical Lessons, B3 Front.  CDEC 
COMUSMACV.  Retrieved 10 August 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Dung, Van Tien. (1976).  Sen Gen Van Tien Dung article: “Great Spring Victory.”  
Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, Vol. IV, No. 110, Supp 38.  
Retrieved 6 May 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Felix, Edward A. (1971).  Antipacification Activities, VC Sub-Region 5 Party 
Committee, COSVN.  CDEC COMUSMACV.  History of the Vietnam War on 
Microfilm.  Vietnam Archive.  Texas Tech University. 
Felix, Edward A. (Prepared by) (1971).  Plan for Reorganization of Sapper Units, VC 
Quang Da Special Zone, VC Military Region 5.  CDEC COMUSMACV.  History 
of the Vietnam War on Microfilm.  Retrieved 13 July 2004, from 
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Francis, D. G., and Vallentiny, E. (1968).  Attack on Udorn.  Project CHECO Report.  
Directorate of Operations Analysis, HQ, Pacific Air Force.  Vietnam Archive.  
Texas Tech University. 
Graham, William R. (Prepared by) (1968). Communist Military and Political Plans, 
1968-1969 Winter-Spring Campaign.  CDEC COMUSMACV.  Vietnam Archive, 
Texas Tech University. 
Graham, William R. (Prepared by) (1968). VC/NVA Offensive Techniques in Cities and 
Towns.  CDEC-COMUSMACV. Translation of a J2, Joint General Staff, Army of 
the Republic of Vietnam Study.  Retrieved 6 May 2004, from 
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Horne Jr., Kelso C. (Prepared by) (1972).  3rd Company, Z28 Sapper Bn, VC/NVA 
Military Region C40 in the Khmer Republic.  CDEC COMUSMACV.  History of 
the Vietnam War on Microfilm.  Retrieved 6 May 2004, from 
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
49 
Horne Jr., Kelso C. (Prepared by) (1972).  Planned Activities of the K20 Company, H5 
Sapper Battalion, Sub-Region 6, Headquarters, SVNLA.  CDEC COMUSMACV.  
History of the Vietnam War on Microfilm.  Vietnam Archive.  Texas Tech 
University. 
Hosmer, Stephen T., Jenkins, Brian M., and Kellen, Konrad. (1977).  The Fall of South 
Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders.  Santa 
Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation.  Retrieved 13 July 2004, from 
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Kneipp, Nancy V. (1996). The Tet Offensive and the Principles of War. Naval War 
College. Retrieved 13 July 2004, from http://www1.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Krepinevich Jr., Andrew F. (1986). The Army and Vietnam.  Baltimore, MD: The John 
Hopkins University Press. 
Laird Memorandum to President on Vietnam Trip: March 1969.  (1969).  History of the 
Vietnam War on Microfilm.  Vietnam Archive.  Texas Tech University. 
Le Gro, William E. (1981). Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation.  U.S. Army Center 
of Military History. Retrieved 2 June 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Len, Hua Yen. (1998).  The Line of Steel at Xuan Loc-12 Days and Nights of Ferocious 
Combat against the North Vietnamese Communists.  Correspondence to Major 
General Le Minh Dao, former commander of the 18th Infantry Division(ARVN).  
Retrieved 6 May 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Lessons Learned in Attacks Conducted in Local Areas by the Sapper Units to Foil The 
Enemy Pacification Program.  (1972).  Translated captured PLAF document.  
Vietnam Archive.  Texas Tech University. 
List of Codes for Objectives, Prepared by an Artillery and Sapper Element of Sub-Region 
3, COSVN.  (1970).  Translated enemy document-CDEC MACV.  Retrieved 19 
May 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Military and Enemy Proselyting Mission and Activities in Winter and Spring of 67-68.  
(1968).  Translated captured document concerning military and enemy 
proselyting.  Vietnam Archive.  Texas Tech University. 
National Liberation Front Propaganda:  An Analysis.  (1962). Saigon: United States 
Information Agency.  Retrieved 8 May 2005, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
New COSVN Policy on General Offensives.  (1968). Translated enemy document-CDEC 
MACV. Retrieved 19 May 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Parks, Rolla S.  (Prepared by) (1972).  Recapitulation Report of the 1st Precinct Unit, VC 
Quang-Da Special Zone, VC Military Region 5.  CDEC COMUSMACV.  History 
of the Vietnam War on Microfilm.  Vietnam Archive.  Texas Tech University. 
50 
Pike, Douglas. (1971). North Vietnam in 1971. Retrieved 19 May 2004, from 
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Preparation for 1968 Tet Offensive-Training Activities. (1968).  CDEC MACV.  
Translated VC cadre notes before and after the Tet offensive.  Retrieved 6 May 
2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
PLAF Directive on Tet 68 Offensive in Hue Area.  (1968).  Translated from captured 
enemy document covering Hue before and after the Tet Offensive.  Retrieved 10 
August 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
PLAF Sapper Training—1974. (1974). History of the Vietnam War on Microfilm.  
Retrieved 19 May 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Preparations for the 1972 Spring-Summer Campaign by the VC Quang Nam Province 
Unit, VC Military Region 5.  (1972).  Translated captured document.  CDEC 
USMACV.  Vietnam Archive.  Texas Tech University. 
Ronca, Theodore J. (Prepared by) (1970).  Order of Battle of the 40th Sapper Bn.  CMIC 
USMACV.  History of the Vietnam War on Microfilm.  Retrieved 6 May 2004, 
from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Somerville, James B. (Prepared by) (1969).  Three-Man Cell Tactics.  CDEC 
COMUSMACV.  Retrieved 6 May 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Study: National Liberation Front of South Vietnam—Organization/Strength.  (1970).  
Study of various captured documents.  Retrieved 13 July 2004, from 
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Suarez, Antonio L. (Prepared by) (1973).  PLAF/PAVN Troop Strength by Unit-May 
1973.  DAO US Embassy, Saigon.  History of the Vietnam War on Microfilm. 
Retrieved 6 May 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
The Decline of VC Capabilities in Sub-Region 5, COSVN, 1969-1970.  (1971).  Contains 
analysis of captured documents relation to VC capabilities.  Retrieved 13 July 
2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
The “Super Guerrilla” Concept: Oct 1969 (Development of PLAF Sapper Teams).  
(1969).  History of the Vietnam War on Microfilm.  Retrieved 6 May 2004, from 
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
The Viet Cong Infrastructure—A Background Paper.  (1970).  Saigon:  United States 
Mission in Vietnam.  Retrieved 10 August 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Turner, Jonathan F. (Prepared by) (1970).  Order of Battle of the 8th Bn, 429th sapper 
Group.  CMIC USMACV.  History of the Vietnam War on Microfilm.  Retrieved 
6 May 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
51 
Todd, Elmer T. (Prepared by) (1971).  204th Bn Sapper Training School.  CMIC 
USMACV.  History of the Vietnam War on Microfilm.  Retrieved 6 May 2004, 
from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
VC Anti-Election Campaigning. (1967).  Translated sample of various captured 
documents.  Retrieved 6 May 2004, from http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Vy, Ton.  (1968).  On the Tri Thien front (From Hue to Khe Sahn).  Vietnamese Studies, 
Number 20, 110-146.  Retrieved 10 August 2004, from 
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu 
Warren, John H. (Prepared by) (1970).  City Fighting Tactics of the U Minh 10 Battalion.  





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
53 
APPENDIX A.   COSVN ADMINISTRATIVE AND MILITARY 
REGIONS—1971 
 
Figure 5.   COSVN Regions (From: Viet Cong Political Geography of South 
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APPENDIX B.   THE RAID THAT FAILED:  THE SAPPER ATTACK 
ON THE US EMBASSY DURING THE 1968 TET OFFENSIVE 
 
 
Figure 6.   PLAF Sapper targets in Saigon during the Tet Offensive (From: Hoang, 
1978, p. 58) 
 
At approximately 0250 on the morning of January 31, 1968, seventeen members 
of the C-10 Urban Sapper Battalion began their assault on the US Embassy in downtown 
Saigon (Dees, 1968, p. 1).  This was not the first time the embassy had been a target 
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during the war, but it was the first time that sappers attempted to seize the embassy.  The 
attack upon the US Embassy was but one of five separate sapper attacks by the C-10 
Urban Sapper Battalion throughout Saigon.  The other targets of the sapper battalion 
included the Independence Palace, the South Vietnamese Naval Command, the South 
Vietnamese General Staff Headquarters, and the Broadcasting Station (Ho, 2001, pp. 70-
72).  Although all the sapper attacks surprised US and ARVN forces, the sappers were all 
killed or captured within a few hours of the initial assaults. 
Communist planners had been working for a number of years prior to 1968 on a 
strategy to overthrow the South Vietnamese Government.  It was decided by COSVN that 
a large-scale offensive designed to attack the large cities in South Vietnam would 
overwhelm the government.  The plan called for PLAF Main Force units to infiltrate and 
seize various cities, thereby causing a popular uprising of disaffected citizens that US or 
ARVN forces would be unable to put down.  In Saigon, this meant that elements of the 
C-10 Urban Sapper Battalion would attack key points inside the city with PLAF Main 
Force units quickly moving into Saigon to reinforce or relieve the sappers.  These 
successful attacks would then spur the angry citizens of Saigon to rise up against the 
South Vietnamese government.  Once all of the major cities of South Vietnam were 
captured by the communist forces, the South Vietnamese government would have no 
choice but to negotiate for peace or flee to another country. 
The sappers’ plan against the embassy was very simple, but not very realistic.  
Using a combination of shaped charges and RPG’s, one sapper team was to blow a hole 
in the embassy wall so that the rest of the sappers could infiltrate into the compound.  
Once inside the compound another cell was to use RPG’s to blow a hole in the main 
entrance so that the rest of the sappers could enter the actual embassy building.  Once 
inside the embassy, the sappers were to wait until relieved by PLAF Main Force units.  
Unfortunately for the sappers, this plan did not take into consideration the security forces 
inside the embassy, or the external security forces nearby the embassy.  The sappers did 
not seem to know the layout of the embassy very well, including where all the entrances 
were inside the compound.  All information indicated that the sappers had thoroughly 
reconnoitered the outside of the embassy compound, but had little knowledge of the inner 
workings of the embassy. 
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Once the outer embassy perimeter was breached, the sapper cells were able to 
enter the compound and move into the courtyard.  After killing some of the American 
Military Policemen guarding the embassy, the sappers became bogged down inside the 
courtyard.  The sappers lost inertia because of the fire from security forces, as well as not 
knowing the exact layout of the embassy.  Almost immediately after the first explosion at 
the embassy, the radio call went out relaying that the embassy was under attack.  Once 
received, reinforcements began to make their way to the embassy.  As more and more 
reinforcements entered the fight, the sappers became pinned down inside the courtyard by 
the heavy fire.  By approximately 0900 the US embassy had been secured.  American 
casualties were five killed and a number wounded while the sappers suffered fifteen dead 
and two captured, though no documentation can be found of what happened to the 
captured sappers (Dees, 1968, p.1). 
Although the attack was bold and surprise was achieved, the sappers violated at 
least two of their principles.  A thorough reconnaissance of the embassy was not 
completed prior to the attack, which led to a loss of inertia for the attack teams.  Once 
inside the embassy compound, the teams were not relieved by PLAF Main Force units 
and subsequently had to fight against superior forces that only increased as time went by.  
An argument could also be made that the sappers did not utilize multiple-axis of advance 
during the attack.  Once the perimeter wall was breached, all the cells used that breach 
and seemingly rushed towards the only known entry.  To put it simply, the attack on the 
embassy failed because the sappers’ plan was poor.  The planners did not stick with their 
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Figure 7.   Map of Lima Site 85, Laos (From: 
http://star.vietnam.ttu.edu/starweb/vva/servlet.starweb) 
 
Lima Site 85 
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Lima Site 85 sits on a hilltop in northern Laos near the border with North 
Vietnam.  Originally, Lima Site 85 was a base area for anti-communist Laotian guerrillas, 
but by 1966 the American Air Force established a radar-site on Phou Pha Thi Mountain 
(Vallentiny, 1968, p. viii).  This radar site was used for Tactical Air Control and 
Navigation (TACAN) for aircraft on bombing missions into North Vietnam and 
communist controlled Laos.  American aircraft used the TACAN at Lima Site 85 for 
precise radar bombing in all types of weather.   Security at the site was provided by hired 
Meo tribesmen with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) support (Vallentiny, p. 4).  There 
were no US military personnel at the site because of Laotian neutrality, but there were 
between 15 and 25 American radar technicians along with an odd assortment of US 
Embassy personnel and CIA officers (Vallentiny, p. ix).  Lima Site 85 was an important 
installation for the US because of the sensitivity of its equipment and mission.  Because 
of its mission, the site was also a vital target for the Pathet Lao and PAVN force 
operating in the area. 
North Vietnamese forces had an intense interest in eliminating Lima Site 85.  The 
non-communist guerrilla forces that operated in the area destabilized any communist 
control and potentially threatened the beginning routes that made up the Ho Chi Minh 
trail.  It was also no secret that there was a radar site on the mountain although there is no 
evidence that the Vietnamese realized exactly how important the TACAN site was for US 
bombing efforts.  By late 1967 battalion sized PAVN formations and smaller Pathel Lao 
units began operating in the general area of the TACAN site in an attempt to clear the 
non-communist forces.  In early 1968 there were signs that communist forces were 
getting closer to the site.  On 13 January 1968 between two and four AN-2 Colts flown 
by North Vietnamese pilots attacked the site with improvised bombs made from 120mm 
mortar rounds and 57mm rockets (Vallentiny, p. 12).  No damage was done to the 
TACAN site nor were there any American casualties, but the local security force did 
suffer a small number of dead and wounded.  At least two of the AN-2 Colts were 
downed by fire from defensive positions.  Communist activity in the area continued 
subsequent to the air attack.  PAVN and Pathet Lao forces seemed to be moving north 
and south of Lima Site 85 in an effort to surround it.  By mid-February, communist forces 
moved close enough to hit the southern portions of the site with artillery (Vallentiny, p. 
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19).  Later in the month, documents captured from communist forces indicated that a 
large ground attack was planned shortly against the TACAN site (Vallentiny, p. 22).  By 
early March, PAVN and Pathet Lao forces had nearly encircled Lima Site 85, and it 
appeared likely that the ground assault could come at any time. 
Beginning on the evening of March 10, 1968 PAVN and Pathet Lao forces began 
to shell Lima Site 85.  The artillery barrage lasted approximately an hour and a half 
causing only minor damage to the actual TACAN equipment although the site defenses 
did sustain moderate damage (Vallentiny, p. 31).  Later in the evening, another barrage 
struck the site, but as with the first barrage little damage was sustained.  The situation 
grew quiet for the rest of the evening and into the early hours of March 11.  The quiet 
was shattered by explosions and automatic weapons fire within the site itself.  At 
approximately 0300, teams of PAVN sappers inside the site perimeter opened fire on the 
various TACAN facilities (A Military Region Sapper Team’s Surprise Attack on the 
TACAN Site on Pha-Thi Mountain, 1996, p. 14).  Within 45 minutes of the initial assault, 
PAVN sappers controlled Lima Site 85 and its sensitive TACAN equipment. 
In mid-December of 1967, an eight man sapper team that included the units’ 
leader and assistant leader conducted a thorough reconnaissance of Lima Site 85 (A 
Military Region Sapper Team’s Surprise Attack on the TACAN Site on Pha-Thi 
Mountain, 1996, p. 9).  This reconnaissance included a meticulous terrain analysis, 
detailed understanding of the defensive positions and guard movements, route ingress and 
egress study, and analysis of the normal day-to-day routine of the site.  A second 
reconnaissance mission was carried out in January of 1968 with the objective to confirm 
the exact location of critical targets and probe the defensive positions (A Military Region 
Sapper Team’s Surprise Attack on the TACAN Site on Pha-Thi Mountain, 1996, p. 10).  
Both reconnaissance missions went unnoticed by Lima Site 85 security personnel.  From 
their reconnaissance, the sappers planned for the unit to split into two teams, one to deal 
with the site security personnel while the other team was to attack the TACAN site itself.  
The two sapper elements were composed of 33 personnel, three officers, 15 non- 
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commissioned officers, and 15 soldiers, who were armed with Ak-47s, RPGs, grenades, 
pistols, and carbines (A Military Region Sapper Team’s Surprise Attack on the TACAN 
Site on Pha-Thi Mountain, 1996, p. 6). 
The sapper unit started to move towards Lima Site 85 from its staging area the 
first week of March 1968.  Beginning on 8 March, the team began to slip past the outer 
defenses near the intended target without being detected.  On the morning of 10 March 
the sapper teams arrived at the base of the mountain on which Lima Site 85 sat, a 2000ft 
climb (A Military Region Sapper Team’s Surprise Attack on the TACAN Site on Pha-Thi 
Mountain, 1996, p. 13).  The sapper teams moved out in the early evening towards their 
actual targets so that they would be in place by early morning on 11 March.  At a pre-
designated time, the two sapper teams broke into their assault cells and began movement 
into their attack positions.  While moving into position, one cell encountered an 
unexpected defensive position and grenades were exchanged, thereby opening the attack 
upon Lima Site 85 (A Military Region Sapper Team’s Surprise Attack on the TACAN Site 
on Pha-Thi Mountain, 1996, p. 14).  The other assault cells were already in position so 
that when the grenades explosions were heard the cells began the assault.  Using 
automatic weapons fire, grenades, and RPGs the sappers quickly overwhelmed the site 
security personnel and American technicians.  The sapper force continued to hold Lima 
Site 85 for a few days and then withdrew after numerous air strikes.  The daring sapper 
raid destroyed a significant radar site and left one American technician dead and 11 
American technicians missing-in-action (Vallentiny, p. 22). 
The sapper raid on Lima Site 85 succeeded because the sappers correctly used 
their established tactics and procedures.  The sapper leader made a comprehensive 
reconnaissance of the objective, making sure to observe all defensive points and his 
ingress and egress routes.  Until the very last minute of the attack, the sapper teams 
managed to keep their presence secret.  The sappers were able to react quickly enough 
once the assault cells were detected.  The teams maneuvered up the mountain, through 
the defensive perimeter, and to their different jump-off points.  These jump-off points 
allowed the sappers to attack the site using multiple axis of attack that confused the  
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defenders and technicians.  Because of their skill and determination, the sappers suffered 
few casualties and destroyed a key American site that controlled many of the bombing 
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